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A classic issue in macroeconomics is whether or not optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent. In a monetary economy, Calvo (1978) shows that the incentive for the government to inflate away its nominal liabilities leads to a time consistency problem for optimal policies. In a real economy, Lucas and Stokey (1983) show that the incentive for the government to devalue its real debt typically also leads to a time consistency problem for optimal policies. They show that, with a carefully chosen maturity structure for real government debt, optimal policies can be made time consistent in a real economy. But they conjecture that the analogous result does not hold for a monetary economy with both nominal and real debt. Contrary to their conjecture, we show that for a class of monetary economies typically used in applied work, optimal policies are time consistent.
Our benchmark model is an infinite horizon model with end-of-period money balances in the utility function of the representative consumer. In this model, the government has access to nominal and real debt of all maturities and must finance a given stream of government expenditures with a combination of consumption taxes and seigniorage. Following Lucas and Stokey (1983) , we abstract from the well-understood problems arising from capital taxation by not including any kind of capital. We also discuss variations of our model, such as those with beginning-of-period balances in the utility function as well as cash-credit economies and shopping time economies.
We establish our result in two steps. We first show that for a class of monetary economies typically used in applied work, the optimal policy under commitment is the Friedman rule of setting the nominal interest rate to zero. We then show that if the Friedman rule is optimal under commitment in such economies, then the optimal policy is time consistent. For the benchmark economy, we also show the converse, that if the optimal policy is time consistent, then the Friedman rule is optimal under commitment.
Our approach to the issue of time consistency is basically that of Lucas and Stokey (1983) .
To establish our benchmark for optimal policy, we begin by solving for Ramsey policies, namely, the optimal policies in an environment in which the initial government has a commitment technology that binds the actions of future governments. In this environment, therefore, the initial government chooses policy once and for all. Ramsey policies here consist of sequences of consumption taxes and money supplies.
We then turn to the environment of interest, in which no such commitment technology exists.
Here each government inherits a maturity structure of nominal and real debt and decides on the current setting for the consumption tax and the money supply, as well as on the maturity structure of nominal and real debt that its successor will inherit. We ask whether a maturity structure of government debt can be chosen so that all governments carry out the Ramsey policies. If it can, we say that the Ramsey policies are time consistent, or equivalently, that the Ramsey problem is time consistent.
We find that if the Ramsey policies are to be time consistent, then the structure of the nominal bonds which a government in a particular time period leaves to its successor in the next period must be severely restricted. One of these restrictions is well understood: the present value of these nominal claims must be zero. If this present value is positive, then the successor will inflate the nominal claims away by setting the price level to be very high, while if the present value is negative, then the successor will make its claims on the public large by setting the price level to be very low.
In this sort of environment, if the Ramsey policies are to be time consistent, the government in any period must be able to induce its successor to carry out its plan even with these restrictions.
The restrictions constrain the ability of any government to influence its successor primarily through the maturity structure of the real bonds. When the Friedman rule is optimal, consumers are satiated with money balances, and no seigniorage is raised-as if money has disappeared-so that the economy is equivalent to a real economy with one consumption good and labor. For such a real economy, we can use the same scheme for the maturity structure of real debt that Lucas and Stokey (1983) use to show that optimal policy is time consistent. We show that this result holds for our benchmark economy as well as some other commonly used monetary economies.
We argue that economies for which the Friedman rule is optimal-and, hence, those for which optimal policies are time consistent-are of applied interest. This is because the preferences in these economies are the most frequently used in the applied literature. An appealing feature of them is that they are consistent with the growth facts.
For our benchmark economy, we also prove the converse of our main result: if the optimal policy is time consistent, then the Friedman rule is optimal under commitment. A critical step in proving this result is uncovering some subtle extra restrictions on nominal debt: if the Friedman rule does not hold in some period, then the present value of nominal bonds from that period on must be zero. In general, the government in any period is so restricted in influencing its successor that it cannot induce the government to carry out the continuation of its plan.
One way to get some intuition for our results is to count instruments and policies in a finite horizon version of our economy in a manner reminiscent of that of Tinbergen (1956) . The basic idea is that in order for a government's policies to be time consistent, the government must have at least as many instruments of influence on its successor as its successor has policy choices. In a T-period economy, the period 1 government chooses 2T policies-the T taxes on consumption and the T taxes on real balances. The extra restrictions on nominal debt discussed above imply that the period 0 government has effectively only the T real bonds as instruments to influence the period 1 government. When the Friedman rule is optimal, money effectively disappears, and the period 1 government has only T policies. Hence, the period 0 government has sufficiently many instruments to induce its successor to carry out its plan, and the solution to the Ramsey problem is time consistent for period 1. A similar argument holds for other periods. When the Friedman rule is not optimal, the period 0 government does not have enough instruments to induce its successor to carry out its plan, and thus, the solution to the Ramsey problem is not time consistent.
For most of this study, we follow the original approach to time consistency used by Calvo (1978) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) in order to highlight the relation between our results and the earlier literature in the most transparent way. We also relate this approach to the approaches of sustainable plans used by Chari and Kehoe (1990) and credible policies used by Stokey (1991) .
Those approaches explicitly build the government's lack of commitment into the environment with an equilibrium concept in which governments explicitly think through how their choices of debt influence their successors' choices. We show that optimal policies are time consistent if and only if they are supportable as a Markov sustainable equilibrium. Relating the concepts of time consistency and sustainable plans is of interest in itself.
Our study is related to that of Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987) . They argue that with a sufficiently rich term structure of both nominal and real government debt, optimal policies can be made time consistent regardless of whether or not the Friedman rule is satisfied. Unfortunately, their result is not true. Calvo and Obstfeld (1990) sketch a variational argument which suggests that the solution proposed by Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987) is not time consistent. Calvo and Obstfeld conjecture that the mistake of those researchers is that their proposed solution violates the second-order conditions. We formalize the Calvo-Obstfeld conjecture here and precisely characterize the conditions under which it applies. We find that the mistake of Persson, Persson, and Svensson has less to do with second-order conditions than with a lack of attention to endogenous restrictions on the nominal debt that a government can leave to its successor. More importantly, unlike Calvo and Obstfeld, we conclude that Ramsey policies are time consistent for an interesting set of economies.
The Ramsey Problem and the Friedman Rule
We start by constructing our benchmark economy, describing its Ramsey problem, and demonstrating the conditions under which the Friedman rule is optimal in this economy. In so doing, we extend the results in the literature to a somewhat broader class of environments. We show that for preferences commonly used in applied work, the Friedman rule is optimal. These preferences are attractive because they are consistent with balanced growth. We also describe restrictions on government debt which are necessary for the existence of an interior solution to the Ramsey problem in this economy.
The Benchmark Economy
Consider an economy with money, nominal government debt, and real government debt.
Time is discrete. The resource constraint is given by
where c t , g t , and l t denote consumption, government spending, and labor in time period t. Throughout, the sequence of government spending is exogenously given.
In this economy, consumers have preferences over sequences of consumption c t , real money balances m t , and labor l t given by
with the discount factor 0 < β < 1, where m t = M t /p t is defined as end-of-period nominal money balances M t divided by the nominal price level p t . We assume that the period utility function U(c, m, l) is concave, twice continuously differentiable, increasing in c, and decreasing in l. We also assume that consumers are satiated at a finite level of real balances, so that for each value of c and l, there is a finite level of m such that U m (c, m, l) = 0, where here and throughout, we let U m and U mm denote the partial derivatives ∂U/∂m and ∂ 2 U/∂m 2 , respectively. We use analogous notation for other partial derivatives throughout.
In terms of assets, we assume that the government issues both nominal and real bonds for every maturity. For the nominal bonds, for each period t and s with t ≤ s, we let Q t,s denote the price of one dollar in period s in units of dollars in period t, and we let B t,s denote the number of such nominal bonds. Similarly, for the real bonds, we let q t,s denote the price of one unit of consumption in period s in units of consumption in period t and let b t,s denote the number of such real bonds. We let B t = (B t,t+1 , B t,t+2 , . . .) denote the vector of nominal bonds purchased by consumers in t which pay off B t,s in s for all s ≥ t + 1. We use similar notation for the real bonds b t and the nominal and real debt prices Q t and q t . For later use, note that arbitrage among these bonds implies that for all t ≤ r ≤ s, their prices satisfy Q t,s = Q t,r Q r,s , q t,s = q t,r q r,s , and Q t,s = q t,s p t /p s . By convention, Q t,t = 1 and q t,t = 1. Each consumer's sequence of budget constraints in period t can be written as
Thus, in period t, each consumer has a nominal wage income of p t l t , nominal money balances M t−1 , a vector of nominal bonds B t−1 , and a vector of real bonds b t−1 . Consumers purchase consumption c t , new money balances M t , and new vectors of nominal bonds B t and real bonds b t . Purchases of consumption are taxed at the rate τ t . In period 0, consumers have initial money balances M −1 , together with initial vectors of nominal and real bonds B −1 and b −1 . We assume that in each period, the real values of both nominal and real bonds, or debt, purchased are bounded by a constant. This constant can be chosen sufficiently large so that the constraint does not bind.
For convenience, we will work with the consumers' problem in period 0 form. The sequence of budget constraints (3) can be collapsed to the period 0 budget constraint:
We can interpret the term (1 − Q t,t+1 )m t as the effective tax on real balances paid by consumers.
Notice that this effective tax is positive when Q t,t+1 < 1 and zero when Q t,t+1 = 1. The consumers' problem in period 0 is to choose sequences of consumption, real balances, and labor to maximize (2) subject to (4).
In period t, the government inherits the nominal money M t−1 , the nominal debt vector B t−1 , and the real debt vector b t−1 . To finance government spending g t , the government collects consumption taxes τ t c t and issues new money M t , new nominal debt B t , and new real debt b t . The government's sequence of budget constraints is analogous to that of the consumer. We collapse this constraint into the period 0 budget constraint:
We use the notation t c = (c t , c t+1 , . . .) for consumption and similar notation for real balances, labor, prices, and taxes. For given initial conditions M −1 , B −1 , and b −1 , then, a period 0 competitive equilibrium is a collection of sequences of consumption, real balances, and labor ( 0 c, 0 m, 0 l) together with sequences of prices ( 0 p, Q 0 , q 0 ) and taxes 0 τ that satisfy the resource constraint in each period and consumer maximization. The government budget constraint is then implied.
In any equilibrium, nominal interest rates are nonnegative, so that the one-period bond price Q t,t+1 = 1 + (U mt /U lt ) ≤ 1. Since U lt < 0, for interest rates to be nonnegative, the marginal utility of money must satisfy
which we refer to as the nonnegative interest rate constraint. As is well known, the allocations in a competitive equilibrium are characterized by three simple conditions: the resource constraint (1), the nonnegative interest rate constraint (6), and the implementability constraint,
where R(c t , m t , l t ) = c t U ct + m t U mt + l t U lt is the government surplus τ t c t + (1 − Q t,t+1 )m t − g t expressed in marginal utility units and Q 0,t = t−1 s=0 [1 + (U ms /U ls )]. This implementability constraint should be thought of as the period 0 budget constraint of either the consumers or the government, where the consumers' first-order conditions have been used to substitute out prices and policies.
The Ramsey Problem
Given the initial conditions M −1 , B −1 , and b −1 , the Ramsey problem in period 0 is to choose 0 c, 0 m, 0 l, and p 0 to maximize consumers' utility (2) subject to the economy's resource constraint (1), the nonnegative interest rate constraint (6), and the implementability constraint (7).
Our results will depend critically on whether or not the allocations that solve this problem satisfy the Friedman rule, in that Q t,t+1 = 1, for all t, so that nominal interest rates are zero in every period. Since Q t,t+1 = 1 + (U mt /U lt ) and U lt < 0, the Friedman rule holds if and only if U mt = 0, for all t.
We now discuss the initial conditions for both nominal and real government debt that we choose for the Ramsey problem. To make the problem interesting, we want initial conditions for which distortionary taxes are necessary. A sufficient condition for this to be true is that in each period t, the sum of government spending and its real initial debt maturing in period t is positive.
That is, g t + b −1,t ≥ 0 for all t with strict inequality for some t. We assume that this condition 
Under (8), the present value of nominal liabilities in (7) is identically equal to zero, and the Ramsey problem is independent of p 0 .
The Friedman Rule
In the next section, we will show that the Ramsey problem is time consistent if and only if the Friedman rule is optimal in each period. Here we establish sufficient conditions for the Friedman rule to be optimal in each period in an economy that satisfies (8).
If we let γ t , η t , and λ 0 denote the multipliers on the resource constraint (1), the nonnegative interest rate constraint (6), and the implementability constraint (7) and if we assume (8), then for t ≥ 1, the first-order conditions for c t , m t , and l t are
where
and where Q it,t+1 are the derivatives of 1 + (U mt /U lt ) with
) /p 0 to the left side of (9) and analogous terms to (10) and (11). Finally, the first-order condition for the initial price level is
We can use these first-order conditions to establish circumstances under which the Friedman rule is optimal. Consider an economy with preferences that are separable and homothetic, in that (2000).) The following proposition, proved in the Appendix, is related to but not covered by the results of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996) .
If preferences are separable and homothetic and the initial nominal government liabilities are all zero, then the Friedman rule is optimal.
Again, many preferences commonly used in applied work are covered by Proposition 1. Sometimes, however, applied work uses nonseparable homothetic preferences. In Proposition 2, we show that the Friedman rule is also optimal for such preferences as long as at the point of satiation, real balances and leisure are Pareto substitutes, in the sense that U ml ≥ 0. This proposition uses a much weaker form of homotheticity than Proposition 1:
for any α, which implies that real balances and consumption grow at the same rate along a balanced growth path. Notice that the case in which U ml > 0 at the point where U m = 0 corresponds to the case in which the nonnegativity constraint on interest rates binds at the Friedman rule.
Assume that initial nominal government liabilities are all zero and that
If preferences are consistent with balanced growth in the sense of (13), then the Friedman rule solves the Ramsey problem.
In the proof, given in the Appendix, we show that if U ml ≥ 0 and preferences are consistent with balanced growth, then we can construct a feasible allocation and nonnegative multipliers that satisfy the first-order conditions and the implementability condition. We obtain this allocation by solving the Ramsey problem for a corresponding real economy without money. This real economy has utility functionŪ(c, l) = U(c, m * (c, l), l) where m * (c, l) is the satiation level of money balances so that U m (c, m * , l) = 0. The constructed allocation solves the Ramsey problem in the monetary economy because it is as if money has disappeared in that economy: consumers are satiated with money, seigniorage is zero, and R m = 0, so that the marginal effect on revenues from a change in real balances is zero.
An immediate application of this proposition lets us extend our results to cash-credit and shopping time economies. Also, the proposition is related to, but not covered by, the results of Correia and Teles (1999) .
Propositions 1 and 2 cover many preferences commonly used in applied work. These preferences are chosen to be consistent with the growth facts. For the sake of completeness, note that not all preferences that satisfy the growth facts imply that the Friedman rule is optimal. In particular, preferences such as U = c 1−σ v (m/c, l) / (1 − σ) satisfy balanced growth, but with them the Friedman rule is not optimal if v 12 /v 11 > 0. For such preferences, U ml is negative at U m = 0.
Endogenous Restrictions on Nominal Debt Left to Future Governments
In the next section, we will carefully define our notion of time consistency. The intuitive idea is that for each period t, the period t government must be able to leave vectors of nominal and real debt to its successor, the period t + 1 government, so that the successor has the incentive to carry out the continuation of the plan of the period t government. Under our assumptions, the Ramsey problem in period 0 will entail an interior solution for p t+1 for all t. Thus, for any vector of nominal debt left to a government at t + 1 to be part of a time consistent solution, the successor government must, having inherited such a vector, choose an interior solution for the price level p t+1 . Here we develop necessary restrictions on initial nominal debt vectors for such an interior solution to exist.
In the lemma below, we show that the necessary restrictions for an interior solution to exist are that if the Friedman rule does not hold in some period, then from that period on, the present value of nominal debt must be zero. Although useful in the analysis of time consistency, the lemma is simply about the type of restrictions that initial nominal debt vectors must satisfy in order for an interior solution to a Ramsey problem to exist. (We use this lemma later in Proposition 4, when we develop some necessary conditions for the solution to a Ramsey problem to be time consistent.)
For notational simplicity, we focus on the restrictions the nominal debt inherited by the period 0 government must satisfy; the same logic applies to any period t. (Of course, for the period 0 government, the inherited debt is part of the environment, while for any period t government with t ≥ 1, the inherited debt is part of the endogenous construction of a potentially time consistent plan. Regardless, the lemma applies to any period t ≥ 0.)
Clearly, for the Ramsey problem in period 0 to have an interior solution for p 0 -that is, 0 < p 0 < ∞-M −1 and B −1 must satisfy the condition that
This condition, however, is not enough to eliminate the nominal forces that lead to the nonexistence of an interior solution. We show that the following stronger conditions are necessary. If in some period s, the Friedman rule does not hold, so that Q s,s+1 < 1, then the present value of government debt from period s + 1 on must be zero, so that
Given our assumptions on g t + b t , there must some period-say, r-in which consumption taxes are being levied, so that −U cr /U lr = 1 + τ r > 1. We will assume that in this period r, the second derivatives satisfy the conditions that
The following lemma determines restrictions that inherited nominal debt must satisfy for an interior solution to that government's problem to exist.
L
: Assume that an interior solution to the Ramsey problem in period 0 with 0 < p 0 < ∞ exists, that there is some period s in which the Friedman rule does not hold, that there is some period r in which consumption taxes are levied, and that in period r the conditions (16) hold. Then the value of initial nominal government debt from s + 1 on is zero, so that (15) holds.
The proof of the lemma (provided in the Appendix) is rather intricate and is related to the informal variational argument suggested by Calvo and Obstfeld (1990) . We summarize it here. The proof proceeds by contradiction. We suppose that at the solution, the Friedman rule does not hold, and the present value of the nominal government liabilities from period 0 on is zero, but the present value from period t on is not zero. We then show that no such solution can exist by constructing an allocation that gives higher utility. In the construction, we perturb the original allocation in two steps. The first step is a small variation in nominal interest rates, which may entail lowering them.
This variation will make the present value from period 0 on strictly negative, so that the consumers owe the government some nominal amount. Once the consumers owe the government any nominal amount, say, one dollar, the government can raise any amount of revenues it desires in a lump-sum fashion by making the initial price level low enough. The second step of the perturbation is to reduce distortionary taxes and thus increase welfare while keeping the nominal interest rates unchanged from the first step to ensure that the consumers owe the government some nominal amount. We begin with a definition of time consistency. For convenience, define the Ramsey problem in period t, given inherited values for money balances M t−1, nominal debt B t−1 , and real debt b t−1 , to be the problem of choosing allocations from period t onward, t c, t l, and t m, and the price level
subject to the resource constraint and the nonnegative interest rate constraint (6) for each s ≥ t and the implementability constraint in t,
The Ramsey problem in period t is said to be time consistent for t + 1 if values exist for nominal money balances M t , nominal debt B t , and real debt b t that satisfy two conditions. First, the nominal money balances M t are consistent with the period t allocation in that M t = p t m t .
Second, the continuation of the Ramsey allocations in period t from t + 1 on-namely, t+1 c, t+1 m, and t+1 l together with the price level p t+1 -solve the Ramsey problem in t + 1, where the price level p t+1 is a function of the allocations and the nominal money supply according to
.
The Ramsey problem in period 0 is time consistent if the Ramsey problem in period t is time consistent for t + 1 for all t ≥ 0.
Given this definition, the way to establish that a Ramsey problem in, say, period 0 is time consistent for period 1 is to show how the initial conditions for the period 1 problem-M 0 , B 0 , and b 0 -can be chosen so as to give incentives for the government in period 1 to continue with the allocations chosen by the government in period 0.
To keep the proofs simple, we assume here that the utility function is weakly increasing in m; hence, we can drop the nonnegative interest rate constraint in the Ramsey problem. For later use, however, recall from the proof of the lemma (in the Appendix) that under this assumption, if
A simple example illustrates the main ideas behind two propositions to come, Propositions 3 and 4, which give sufficient and necessary conditions under which the Ramsey problem is time consistent.
E
: Let the utility function U be additively separable in its three arguments. Let g t be zero in all periods, so that c t = l t . Let initial government debt have b −1,0 = b > 0 and be zero in all other periods, and let nominal government debt satisfy (8). For the period 0 Ramsey problem, consider the combined first-order conditions for c t and l t for t ≥ 1,
and the first-order condition for m t for t ≥ 0,
Clearly, c t and l t are constant for t ≥ 1, and m t is constant for t ≥ 0. It is easy to show that a constant level of positive taxes is levied in each period t ≥ 1, so that the sum U ct + U lt > 0 and is constant for each t ≥ 1.
To make this allocation time consistent for period 1, we must be able to choose new government debt B 0,t and b 0,t , new nominal money balances M 0 , and a new multiplier λ 1 which support the continuation of the period 0 allocations. To be able to do that, these constructed objects must satisfy the first-order conditions for the Ramsey problem in period 1, that is, the combined first-order conditions for c t and l t for all t ≥ 1,
and the first-order condition for m t for t ≥ 1,
We first show that if the Friedman rule holds, then the allocation can be made time consistent.
(By doing so, we highlight some of the key ideas in Proposition 3, below.) We set M 0 + B 0,t = 0 and B 0,t = 0 for all t ≥ 1 and construct b 0t and λ 1 in a way related to that of Lucas and Stokey (1983) . Since c t , m t , and l t are constant in (21), the level of real government debt b 0t does not vary with t; we denote it by b ′ . We use (21) to find b ′ as a function of λ 1 :
We then substitute b ′ into the period t = 1 implementability constraint to solve for λ 1 . Such a λ 1 can Our lemma implies that if interest rates are always positive, then the nominal government debt has to be zero in each period. Motivated by this implication, we suppose here that the new nominal debt satisfies M 0 + B 0,t = 0 and B 0,t = 0 for all t ≥ 1. We argue that with these restrictions on nominal debt, the period 0 allocations cannot be supported. For t ≥ 1, taxes are levied, and the allocations are constant; hence, b 0,t is some positive constant b ′ for all t. Comparing the first-order conditions for m t in periods 0 and 1, we conclude that since U mt > 0 for some t ≥ 1, then λ 1 = λ 0 . Using this multiplier, we evaluate the first-order condition of the period 1 problem (21) at the continuation of the period 0 allocations, which solve (19), to conclude that for all t ≥ 1,
since U llt is negative and both λ 0 and b ′ are positive and the rest of the terms are zero by (19).
This inequality means that at the period 0 allocations, the government has an incentive to deviate from the allocations chosen by the period 0 government. Hence, the period 0 Ramsey problem is not time consistent.
Consider this result at a more abstract level than that simple example. When the restrictions imposed by the lemma are satisfied, the government in period 0 does not have enough instruments of influence to induce the government in period 1 to follow the continuation of the Ramsey policy. The government in period 0 must find a vector of real bonds and a multiplier for the implementability constraint that satisfy the first-order conditions for consumption and leisure (21), the first-order conditions for real balances (22), and the implementability constraints of the period 1 government at the period 0 Ramsey allocation. When the Friedman rule does not hold, in general, no combination of b ′ and λ satisfies all these equations.
We can now use the logic of the example to show that if the Friedman rule holds, then the Ramsey problem is time consistent. To cover the general case, we assume that two regularity conditions hold in each period t: U ct + U lt ≥ 0, so that taxes are nonnegative, and
which is essentially normality of consumption. (In our working paper, Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2002), we give sufficient conditions for taxes to be nonnegative.) We now consider the converse of Proposition 3, that if the Ramsey problem is time consistent, then the Friedman rule is optimal. We assume the following regularity condition. At a Ramsey allocation, if the Friedman rule does not hold for some period t, then
holds, where R(c, m, l) = cU c + mU m + lU l . (This regularity condition ensures that the first-order conditions for the Ramsey problem are not collinear.) This regularity condition is satisfied, for example, when the period utility function U is additively separable in leisure. For such preferences, the left side of (23) reduces to −R mt U llt , and the first-order condition (11) implies that R mt = −U mt /λ = 0.
We also assume that in period 0 the government's budget is not balanced, in that
where Q 0,1 = 1 + (U m0 /U l0 ) and 1 + τ 0 = −U c0 /U l0 .
The proof is a generalization of that used in the example and is in the Appendix. Clearly, our results, especially Proposition 4, are at odds with the results of Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987) . They construct a nominal debt vector to be inherited by the period 1 government and suppose that with this vector as an initial condition, the period 1 government chooses an interior point for p 1 , so that 0 < p 1 < ∞. As our lemma shows, unless the Friedman rule is satisfied, the Ramsey problem in period 1 does not have a solution (with an interior point for p 1 ). Thus, the construction by Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987) is invalidated by endogenous restrictions on the nominal debt vector that they do not take into account.
Intuition: Counting Equations and Unknowns
Whether or not a policy is time consistent depends critically on how many instruments a government in any period has to influence its successor relative to how many choices the successor makes. For time consistency, the number of instruments must be greater than or equal to the number of choices.
We simplify the counting of instruments and choices by considering a finite horizon version of our economy with T periods. To mimic the opportunity cost of holding money in period T that would arise in an infinite horizon economy from the nominal interest rate between period T and period T + 1, we add a direct tax on real balances for period T.
We focus on how the government in period 0 can induce the government in period 1 to carry out the continuation of its plans. We first count the number of instruments that the period 0 government can use to influence the period 1 government. In doing so, we count neither the nominal bonds nor the money supply. We exclude the nominal bonds because the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that the Ramsey problem is time consistent if and only if the Ramsey allocations can be supported by the period 0 government giving the period 1 government zero nominal liabilities in each period by setting M 1 + B 0,1 = 0 and B 0,t = 0 for all t > 1. (In each period, either U mt > 0 and the lemma applies, or U mt = 0 and (18) holds. Either way, the terms in the first-order conditions involving nominal debt drop out.) We do not count the money supply because the period 0 plan includes M 1 , so that there is no freedom in picking this variable. Thus, the only other instruments that the government in period 0 can use to influence the government in period 1 are the T real bonds b 0,t for t = 1, . . . , T .
Now we consider the conditions that define the period 1 government choices, the first-order conditions and the implementability constraint. For t = 1, . . . , T the first-order conditions for c t and l t combined give
while the first-order condition for real balances m t is
The implementability constraint is
These equations form a linear system in 2T + 1 equations and T + 1 unknowns, namely, the T real bonds and the multiplier λ 1 . This system has (many) more equations than unknowns.
When the Friedman rule is optimal, U mt = 0, and using either weak separability or (18), we know that U lmt = 0, and neither b 0t nor λ 1 enters (25). Thus, the linear system reduces to T + 1 equations in T +1 unknowns and, under our regularity conditions, has a unique solution. Thus, here the period 0 government has enough instruments to induce the government in period 1 to carry out the continuation of its plan. Conversely, if the Ramsey problem is time consistent, then T equations must be redundant. Given our regularity conditions, the T redundant equations are the first-order conditions for money, which implies that U mt = 0. Thus, the Friedman rule is optimal.
We have shown that determining whether or not the Ramsey problem is time consistent can be reduced to counting the number of instruments that the government of period 0 has to influence the government in period 1 and the number of conditions that define the choices of the period 1 government and comparing the two numbers. For time consistency, government 0's instruments of influence must be at least as many as government 1's choices.
Throughout we use the primal approach to analyze the Ramsey problem in which all the tax rates and interest rates are substituted out. If instead we had used the dual approach, our counting procedure would be more reminiscent of that of Tinbergen (1956) . We could then compare the number of policies chosen by the government of period 1 to the number of instruments the period 0 government has to influence the period 1 government. The period 1 government must choose 2T policies, the T taxes on consumption and T taxes on real balances (T − 1 nominal interest rates and one direct tax) while the period 0 government has effectively only the T real bonds as instruments.
When the Friedman rule is optimal, money effectively disappears, and the period 1 government has only T policies and the period 0 government has sufficiently many instruments, the T real bonds, to induce its successor to carry out its plan. When the Friedman rule is not optimal, the period 0 government does not have enough instruments to do this.
Extensions to Other Monetary Economies
Our main result is that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent for an interesting class of economies discussed in Propositions 1-3. The benchmark economy we have focused on is an economy with money in the utility function, in which end-of-period real money balances enter that function. Now we show that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent for other interesting economies as well, including a version of our economy with beginning-of-period money balances in the utility function, a cash-credit economy, and a shopping time economy. For completeness, in Proposition 4, we have also given necessary conditions for the time consistency of optimal policies for our benchmark model. Here, we briefly discuss how these necessary conditions may change in other models.
In our model with end-of-period money balances, increases or decreases in the price level have no costs other than their effect on the real value of nominal debt. This makes the time consistency problem severe: if private agents owe the government even a tiny nominal amount, then the government has an incentive to engineer a sharp decrease in the price level to greatly increase the real value of this nominal debt. Even with this severe problem, however, policy is time consistent in an interesting class of economies.
In general, as changing the price level ex post becomes either harder or costlier, the time consistency problem becomes less severe, and the set of circumstances for which optimal policy is time consistent becomes larger. As an extreme, consider the example of Lucas and Stokey (1983) in which the government (or "central bank") can commit to a path for the nominal price level, so that ex post prices cannot be changed from this path. Then, as Lucas and Stokey show, optimal policy will always be time consistent, regardless of the form of preferences. The principle is that, as changing prices ex post becomes harder, the set of sufficient conditions for time consistency expands and the set of necessary conditions for time consistency shrinks.
We turn now to showing how that optimal policy will be time consistent for other commonly used monetary economies.
Beginning-of-Period Real Balances
We start with economies in which the money balances entering a period's utility function are those for the beginning of the period rather than the end. Explicitly, consider a utility function U(c t , m t , l t ), in which now m t = M t−1 /p t denotes the beginning-of-period real money balances.
The implementability constraint for this economy is
where Q 0,t = Note that the time consistency problem is less severe here than in the benchmark economy.
The reason is that an increase in the initial price level decreases the initial real money balances as well as the real value of the nominal debt. To see this, consider the first-order conditions for p 0 :
where, for notational simplicity, we let U be additively separable in m. The left side of (27) is the benefit from increasing the price level. Comparing (27) with (12) demonstrates that here increasing the price level has an extra cost coming from the decrease in real money balances captured by the term U m0 m 0 /p 0 .
The exact analogs of Proposition 1, 2, and 3 hold here. To see this, note that when the initial nominal government liabilities are all zero, the only difference between the Ramsey problems of our benchmark economy and this economy is that the implementability constraint (7) for the benchmark economy has the term m 0 U m0 while the implementability constraint for this economy, (26), does not. In the economy with beginning-of-period balances and zero nominal debt in all periods, using (18), we see that setting U m0 = 0 is optimal, regardless of preferences. The first-order conditions for all other periods are the same in the two economies.
For this economy, the proof of our lemma does not hold; hence, our proof of Proposition 4 does not either. Here, in a Ramsey problem, the initial price level may be interior even if the value of the nominal debt is not zero, as the first-order condition (27) shows. We conjecture that necessary conditions for time consistency are much weaker here than for the benchmark economy.
Cash-Credit and Shopping Time Economies
Consider extending our results to two other commonly used economies-a cash and credit goods economy and a shopping time economy. These economies can be represented as economies with money in the utility function, but the assumption that U m ≥ 0 everywhere may well be violated.
Note that Propositions 1 and 2 apply to these economies because in them we do not require that the utility function is such that U m ≥ 0. Propositions 3 and 4, however, require a slight modification.
Here we discuss the modification to Proposition 3, and in Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2002), we discuss the corresponding Proposition 4.
Consider an economy with cash and credit goods, similar to that of Lucas and Stokey (1983) .
In particular, let the period utility function be h(c 1 , c 2 , l), where c 1 and c 2 are cash and credit goods and l is labor. Assuming that end-of-period real balances are exclusively used to purchase cash goods, we can map the cash-credit economy into our notation by defining U(c, m, l) = h(m, c − m, l), where c = c 1 + c 2 . Notice that even if h is strictly increasing in c 1 and c 2 , the associated utility function U is typically not weakly increasing in m everywhere, as we have assumed in Proposition 3. The monotonicity assumption U m ≥ 0, together with the assumptions of concavity and differentiability, implies that U mm = 0 whenever U m = 0. For the cash-credit economy, U m = 0 when h 1 = h 2 . It can be shown that our monotonicity and concavity assumptions require that at the point where h 1 = h 2 , h 11 = h 22 = h 12 , which in turns implies an infinite elasticity of substitution between cash and credit goods, a very special condition.
Proposition 3 holds for the cash-credit economy if we add an extra regularity condition:
To understand this condition, define the satiation level of money m * (c, l) to be the smallest level of real balances for which its marginal utility is zero; that is, m * (c, l) = min {m :
This regularity condition is met if U is such that m * (c, l) is independent of l and leisure is a normal good. A sufficient condition for this to be true is that U is weakly separable in l, as in
Proposition 3 also holds for a shopping time economy. In this economy, the regularity condition also holds when U is derived from a shopping time technology, as in U (c, m, l) = u(c, l + s (c, m)), where s is the time an agent that consumes c and has m real balances needs to devote to shopping and where the utility is u is defined over c and total labor l + s. We then have P 3 ′ : Assume that the initial nominal claims are zero period by period, so that (8) holds and our strengthened regularity conditions hold. If the Friedman rule holds for each period, then the Ramsey problem is time consistent.
The proof uses a construction similar to that of Proposition 3. The only difference is that now we have to construct η t , the multiplier on the interest rate constraint U mt ≥ 0, as well as b 0
and λ 1 . Our extra regularity condition (28) ensures that there is a unique solution for b 0t and η t as a function of λ 1. We then substitute the resulting expression for b 0,t into the implementability constraint, and under our regularity conditions, there is a unique λ 1 .
Relating Time Consistency to Sustainable Plans
Now we relate Lucas and Stokey's (1983) notion of time consistency to the literature on sustainable plans Kehoe (1990, 1993) and thus the closely related literature on credible policies (Stokey (1991) ). We show that if the Ramsey problem is time consistent, then its solution is sustainable. More precisely, we show that the Ramsey allocations and policies are sustainable outcomes generated by a Markov sustainable equilibrium. Note that the converse is clearly not true; sustainable outcomes are not typically time consistent.
In the Lucas-Stokey definition of time consistency, which we have used here, the government in period 0 solves a problem under the presumption that it has the ability to commit to all its future policies, and consumers act under this presumption as well. What the government in period 0 actually gets to set, however, is the period 0 policies, including the new initial conditions for the government to face in period 1. The problem in period 0 is time consistent for the problem in period 1 if initial conditions exist such that the government in period 1, under a similar presumption about commitment, chooses to continue with the allocations and policies chosen by the government in period 0. Under this definition, the government in period 0 does not explicitly think through how altering the initial conditions for the government of period 1 affects the future government's choices, since the government in period 0 simply presumes it can commit to all future policies.
The sustainable plan literature takes a lack of commitment as given and explicitly builds it into the definition of an equilibrium. In this definition, the government in period 0 realizes both that it cannot commit to all its future policies and that consumers understand this lack of commitment.
This government also explicitly thinks through how altering the initial conditions for the period 1 problem affects the choices of the period 1 government.
In the sustainable equilibrium, the lack of commitment is modeled by having the government choose policy sequentially. Consumer allocations, prices, and government policy are specified as functions of the history of past policies of the government. These functions specify behavior for any possible history, even for histories in which the government deviates from prescribed behavior.
The time consistent equilibrium, in contrast, simply specifies a sequence of allocations, prices, and policies and is thus not directly comparable to a sustainable equilibrium. Along the equilibrium path, however, a sustainable equilibrium generates a particular sequence of allocations, prices, and policies, called a sustainable outcome, which is comparable to the sequences specified by a time consistent equilibrium.
For a version of the Lucas and Stokey (1983) economy without money, Chari and Kehoe (1993) show that the sustainable outcome generated by a Markov sustainable equilibrium solves a simple programming problem. With a little work, their results can be extended to our economy, and it can be shown that for some given initial conditions M −1 , B −1 , and b −1 , the allocations 
subject to the resource constraint and the nonnegative interest rate constraint for t ≥ 0, the imple-
and for t = 1
and the sustainability constraint for all t > 0 Since the Ramsey problem is a less constrained version of the sustainable Markov problem, its value is necessarily higher, so that 
Conclusion
In a simple economy similar to that of Lucas and Stokey (1983) , we have found that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent if and only if the Friedman rule is optimal in this economy. The key ideas behind this result are three: (i) A government has little freedom in using nominal debt to influence successor governments; the primary influence comes, instead, from the appropriate setting of real debt. (ii) When the Friedman rule is not optimal, no government has enough free debt instruments to adequately control the incentives of its successor to carry out its plan. When the Friedman rule is optimal, the government has no desire to use one of its taxes, the nominal interest rate, but the free debt instrument, real debt, is rich enough to control the incentives of the successor government in setting the remaining tax, the consumption tax. (iii) The Friedman rule is optimal for preferences that are widely used in applied work. Hence, this study suggests that, in practice, the type of time consistency problem considered here can be adequately solved by a careful management of government debt.
APPENDIX: Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the Lemma P P 1: Assume, by way of contradiction, that U mt > 0. We can arrange the first-order conditions for consumption c t and real money balances m t to be
Differentiating (13) with respect to α and evaluating it at α = 1 gives that
By weak separability, U lct /U ct = U lmt /U mt . Subtracting (32) from (33) using (34) and weak separability gives that γ t /U ct = 0, which is a contradiction since γ t and U ct are strictly positive.
Q.E.D.
We prove here that the Friedman rule solves the Ramsey problem under the conditions of Proposition 2 by showing that under our hypotheses, we can construct a solution to the first-order conditions and the implementability constraint that satisfies the Friedman rule.
Define the satiation level of money m * (c, l) to be the smallest level of real balances for which its marginal utility is zero; that is, m * (c, l) = min {m : U m (c, m, l) = 0} . As a preliminary result, we show that this satiation level m * (c, l) = cg (l) for some positive and increasing function g(l) and that at that satiation level,
To see this, note that if U m (αc, αm, l) = 0 for all α, we can set α = 1/c and define m * implicitly as U m (1, m * (c, l)/c, l) = 0. Clearly, m * is of the form cg(l). Differentiating U m (c, cg(l), l) = 0 with respect to c and with respect to m gives (35). To see that g is increasing, notice that if U mm < 0, then U ml ≥ 0 if and only if g ′ (l) ≥ 0. If U mm = 0 at the point where U m = 0, as in (18), then
We establish our result by constructing an allocation that solves the first-order conditions of the Ramsey problem in the monetary economy using the first-order conditions for a corresponding real economy. To do so, defineŪ(c, l) = U(c, m * (c, l), l), and define the Ramsey problem for the corresponding real economy as choosing {c t , l t } to maximize β tŪ (c t , l t ) subject to c t + g t = l t and the implementability constraint
Denote the solution as {c * t , l * t } and the multipliers for the resource constraints and the implementability constraints as {γ * t } and λ * .
For the corresponding monetary economy, we need to define the multiplier on the constraint desired change in Q s,s+1 . Then, by lowering the initial price level p 0 , we can generate any desired level of real assets for the government.
In the second step of the perturbation, we lower the taxes in period r, the period that we have hypothesized has positive taxes, in a way that raises utility in that period, satisfies the resource constraint, and holds fixed Q r,r+1 , so that we know that the perturbed allocation still implies a strictly negative value for nominal government liabilities and the first step of the perturbation still works. To that end, note that positive taxes in period r imply that −U lr < U cr . Since U mr ≥ 0, we can increase c r and m r and decrease l r in a way that keeps Q r,r+1 constant, satisfies the resource constraint, and increases utility in period r. Clearly, by the implicit function theorem, for a fixed Q r,r+1 and g r , functions m(c) and l(c) exist such that c, m(c), and l(c) satisfy
and c + g r = l(c). These functions satisfy l ′ (c) = 1, and if U m > 0, then If U m = 0, it must be that Q r,r+1 = 1. Consider the case where U mm < 0. To ensure that (40) holds, it is enough to let m ′ (c) = − (U mc + U ml ) /U mm > 0. In this case, the resulting change in utility in period r is U c + U l > 0. If at some point U m = 0 and U mm = 0, by concavity it must be that U ml = U cm = 0 at this point as well. (To see this, note that if U m = 0 at some point m, then since U is weakly increasing in m, U m = 0 at all points m ′ ≥ m. Thus, since U is twice continuously differentiable, U mm = 0. To see that U mc = 0, note that by concavity U cc U mm −U 2 mc ≥ 0, so U mc = 0. A similar argument applies for U ml .) Hence, a small change in c and l does not change the value of U m , and in particular, this change keeps U m = 0. Thus, increasing c and l by the same small amount changes the period r utility by U c + U l > 0. This establishes the contradiction.
Q.E.D. We construct the values for b 0 and λ 1 in a way similar to that of Lucas and Stokey (1983) .
Consider the combined first-order conditions for c t and l t from (9) and (10), which can be rewritten as b 0,t = − 1 λ 1 (U ct + U lt ) (U lct + U llt ) − (R ct + R lt ) (U lct + U llt ) , which gives our expression for b 0,t for an arbitrary λ 1 . To construct λ 1 , we substitute this expression for b 0,t into the period 1 implementability constraint. Given our assumptions, the fraction (U ct + U lt )/(U lct + U llt ) is negative, and there is a unique solution for λ 1 .
It remains to be shown that the first-order conditions for m t in the period 1 problem
hold. Since U mt = 0, it follows from (18) that R mt = U mt + c t U cmt + m t U mmt + l t U mlt = 0.
Since both sides of (42) are identically zero regardless of the multiplier, these first-order conditions trivially hold.
P P 4:
We show here that under the stated conditions, if the Ramsey problem is time consistent, then the Friedman rule is optimal. We prove this proposition by showing that if the Friedman rule does not hold in some period s ≥ 1, then the Ramsey problem is not time consistent. By way of contradiction, suppose that the Friedman rule does not hold in s ≥ 1, but the Ramsey problem is time consistent. We show that this implies that in period 0, the Ramsey allocation's first-order conditions for the period 1 problem cannot hold, thus establishing a contradiction.
We first show that all the terms involving the nominal government liabilities in the first-order conditions for the period 1 problem are zero. Consider the first-order conditions with respect to c t and l t in the period 1 Ramsey problem. We claim that in any period t ≥ 1, terms of the form
Suppose initially that t is some period in which the Friedman rule holds. Then U mt = 0, and from (18) we know that ∂Q t,t+1 /∂c t = (U mct U lt − U lct U mt )/U 2 lt = 0, where we have used Q t,t+1 = 1 + (U mt /U lt ). A similar argument implies that ∂Q t,t+1 /∂l t = 0; hence, the corresponding terms are also zero under the first-order conditions for l t . Suppose next that t is a period, like period s, in which the Friedman rule does not hold; then (15) does hold, and these terms are zero as well.
Moreover, for the period 1 problem, the first-order condition with respect to p 1 implies that terms of the form (M 0 + ∞ t=0 Q 1,t B 0,t )/p 1 = 0. We now show that the multipliers on the implementability constraints for the Ramsey problems in periods 0 and 1, λ 0 and λ 1 , satisfy λ 0 = λ 1 . To see this, consider the first-order conditions to these problems for period s. From (8) we know that B −1,t is zero for all t ≥ 1. The first-order condition for m s has the form of (11), which can be written as R ms λ 0 + U lms λ 0 b −1,s = −U ms .
Combining the first-order conditions for c s and l s gives that (R cs + R ls ) λ 0 + (U lcs + U lls ) λ 0 b −1,s = −U cs − U ls .
We can regard (44) and (45) as a system of two linear equations in two unknowns, λ 0 and λ 0 b −1,s .
For the period 1 Ramsey problem, U ms > 0 for some s ≥ 1. Our lemma implies that ∞ t=s Q 1,t B 0,t is zero, so that the first-order conditions for the period 1 problem can be written as R ms λ 1 + U lms λ 1 b 0,s = −U ms , (46) (R cs + R ls ) λ 1 + (U lcs + U lls ) λ 1 b 0,s = −U cs − U ls ,
which is a system of linear equations in the two unknowns λ 1 and λ 1 b 0,s . By hypothesis, the Ramsey problem is time consistent; hence, the allocations in the two systems of equations (44)- (45) and (46)- (47) are the same. Our regularity condition (23) implies that there is a unique solution to both and, hence, that λ 0 = λ 1 . Now we will show that there is some period T for which b 0,T = b −1,T . By way of contradiction, suppose not. Since the solution to the Ramsey problem in period 1 is interior, the first-order condition for p 1 implies that
Subtracting the product of β and the period 1 implementability constraint from the period 0 implementability constraint gives U c c 0 + U m0 m 0 + U l0 l 0 = −U l0 b −1,0 , which implies that the budget must be balanced in period 0. This is a contradiction. Hence, there must be some period T for which b 0,T = b −1,T . Using λ 1 = λ 0 and b 0,T = b −1,T , evaluate the first-order condition for the period 1 problem in T for the period 0 allocation. That gives
where we have used the assumption that U lcT + U llT < 0. Thus, the continuation of the period 0 allocation cannot solve the period 1 problem. Hence, the Ramsey problem is not time consistent.
